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Funding the Future: Marketplace Lending, Equity 
Crowdfunding, and Bank Lending 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In October 2017, Arthur Moye, CEO of Full Circle Brewing Co., 
needed a $1 million loan to upgrade and expand his brewery in Fresno, 
California.1  His expansion plan included purchasing larger brewing 
tanks to quadruple the brewery’s capacity, renovating the brewery’s 
building, and going beyond brewing kegs of beer to producing cans of 
beer to sell in stores such as Safeway and Costco.2  Initially, Moye sought 
a traditional bank loan.3  However, instead of providing Full Circle with 
a $1 million loan, Fresno First Bank suggested that the company work 
with crowdfunding firm Breakaway Funding LLC to raise enough capital 
to reduce the bank’s risks of lending.4  The crowdfunding campaign 
allowed the average person to purchase a stake in the brewery with a 
minimum investment of only $500.5  As of January 2018, Full Circle 
raised $124,000 through equity crowdfunding, which then allowed the 
company to obtain a $685,000 traditional loan from Fresno First Bank.6  
In October 2019, Full Circle estimated that over the past two years, its 
production capacity increased fifteen-fold, and its revenues increased by 
335%.7 
Small businesses and startups such as Full Circle traditionally 
face great difficulty in raising money from customary sources of business 
finance, such as bank lending and venture capital.8  Although bank 
 
 1. David Castellon, Full Circle Brewing Taps Success from Equity Crowdfunding, THE 
BUSINESS J. (Jan. 26, 2018, 9:09 AM), https://thebusinessjournal.com/full-circle-brewing-
taps-success-equity-crowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/Q2NS-5BUF]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. About Us, FULL CIRCLE BREWING CO., https://fullcirclebrewing.com/pages/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/2VU7-MGFD] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
 8. C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012). 
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lending remains a major source of funds for entrepreneurial ventures,9 
banks are commonly concerned about businesses’ creditworthiness.10  
This concern makes banks hesitant to provide loans to businesses before 
they have a proven track record, consistent cash flows, and an adequate 
amount of tangible assets they can use as collateral.11  The 2008 financial 
crisis only increased these concerns.12  Although venture capital and 
angel investors address a portion of this need for funding, these investors 
are extremely selective and often only invest in companies with the 
potential for explosive growth.13  From 1981 to 2005, an average of only 
0.1% of startups per year in the United States received venture capital 
funding.14  In response to this gap, crowdfunding developed as a method 
of alternative finance for these small businesses and startups.15 
Through the use of online platforms, crowdfunding projects are 
able to largely bypass bank intermediaries.16  The recent growth of 
crowdfunding—particularly lending-based and equity-based 
crowdfunding platforms—calls into question traditional lending models 
used by banks.17  The rising crowdfunding industry has replaced some 
 
 9. Xavier Walthoff-Borm et al., Equity Crowdfunding: First Resort or Last Resort?, 33 
J. OF BUS. VENTURING 513, 515 (2018). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance: The 
Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, 22 J. OF BANKING 
& FIN. 613, 623–24 (1998) (stating that banks will generally not lend to small businesses until 
“they achieve a level of production where their balance sheets reflect substantial business 
assets that might be pledged as collateral . . . .”). 
 12. See Walthoff-Borm et al., supra note 9, at 515 (explaining the rise of crowdfunding 
as an alternative to traditional bank finance following the 2008 financial crisis). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Manjur Puri & Rebecca Zarutskie, On the Life Cycle Dynamics of Venture-Capital 
and Non-Venture-Capital-Financed Firms, 67 J. OF FIN. 2247, 2255 (2012) (examining 
venture capital statistics for the period 1981 to 2005). 
 15. See Walthoff-Borm et al., supra note 9, at 516 (explaining how crowdfunding 
provides entrepreneurs with an alternative to traditional forms of equity financing and bank 
financing). 
 16. See Raymond Michaels, How Crowdfunding is Challenging the Banking Sector, 
INT’L BANKER (Sept. 14, 2015), https://internationalbanker.com/banking/how-crowdfunding-
is-challenging-the-banking-sector/ [https://perma.cc/9Z69-FQ48] (“Investment 
crowdfunding appears to be filling a gap for small businesses deemed too risky to obtain 
financing through traditional banking methods.”). 
 17. See id. (“As a consequence of this explosive growth, crowdfunding has been asking 
several pertinent questions of the traditional lending models used by banks.”). 
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conventional banking functions.18  Banks must decide whether to 
compete against or collaborate with this new and growing practice.19   
This Note examines current forms of crowdfunding and explores 
competition between crowdfunding and bank lending.  This Note 
proceeds in four parts.  Part II explains crowdfunding and various 
methods of crowdfunding.20  Part III examines the current impact of 
crowdfunding on traditional bank lending.21  Part IV explores existing 
partnerships between banks and crowdfunding platforms.22  Part V offers 
recommendations for how banks should adapt to the crowdfunding 
industry.23   
II.  CROWDFUNDING 
Crowdfunding is a method of raising money for projects or 
ventures from a large number of people.24  Today, this is typically 
performed via the Internet.25  Crowdfunding is a mode of 
crowdsourcing.26  While many believe crowdfunding to be a new 
phenomenon, forms of crowdfunding were used throughout history.27  
For example, in 1885, New York City was short on funds for a pedestal 
 
 18. See id. (providing examples of banks being bypassed for by small businesses seeking 
financing). 
 19. See id. (“Banks have been deciding whether this revolutionary industry should be 
regarded as friend or foe, and as a result, have had to choose between collaborating or 
competing with [online crowdfunding platforms].”). 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. See infra Part V. 
 24. Crowdfunding, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS: OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE (3d ed. 
2015), https://www-oed-
com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/Entry/429943?rskey=hxdLYt&result=2&isAdvanced=false#
eid [https://perma.cc/H475-R76F] (defining crowdfunding as “the practice of funding a 
project or venture by raising money from a large number of people, each of whom contributes 
a relatively small amount, typically via the Internet.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Crowdsourcing, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS: OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE (3d ed. 
2013), https://www-oed-
com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/Entry/376403?rskey=2wuyt8&result=2&isAdvanced=false#
eid [https://perma.cc/ZL84-4994] (defining crowdsourcing as “[t]he practice of obtaining 
information or services by soliciting input from a large number of people, typically via the 
internet and often without offering compensation.”). 
 27. See JD Alois, Kickstarter: On This Date, Joseph Pulitzer Completed Crowdfunding 
Project for Statue of Liberty, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Aug. 11, 2014, 5:19 PM), 
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/08/46581-kickstarter-date-joseph-pulitzer-
completed-crowdfunding-project-statue-liberty/ [https://perma.cc/3NML-DBWX] 
(describing the story of crowdfunding for the pedestal of the statue of liberty). 
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for the Statue of Liberty, recently gifted from France.28  In response, 
Joseph Pulitzer led a successful rewards-based crowdfunding campaign 
to secure funding for the pedestal, rewarding gifts of one dollar or more 
with twelve-inch replicas of the Statue of Liberty.29  Today, 
crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter.com,30 GoFundMe.com,31 and 
Indiegogo.com32 receive considerable attention as methods for 
entrepreneurs to fund their ideas.33   
Crowdfunding intermediaries represent platforms that “act as 
matchmakers between capital-seeking agents and capital-giving agents, 
funneling the funding from the investors to the capital-seeking 
enterprises.”34  Unlike traditional financial intermediaries, crowdfunding 
platforms merely facilitate funding instead of borrowing or lending on 
their own account.35  Crowdfunding platforms are examples of financial 
technology (“fintech”) companies.36  Crowdfunding is generally split into 
five categories: (1) donation-based crowdfunding, (2) rewards-based 
crowdfunding, (3) pre-purchase-based crowdfunding, (4) marketplace 
lending, and (5) equity-based crowdfunding.37  Although donation-
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. KICKSTARTER, kickstarter.com [https://perma.cc/EDY5-NTRE] (last visited Oct. 5, 
2019). 
 31. GOFUNDME, gofundme.com [https://perma.cc/WH4K-SPSG] (last visited Oct. 5, 
2019). 
 32. INDIEGOGO, indiegogo.com [https://perma.cc/JFM6-QCXM] (last visited Oct. 5, 
2019). 
 33. Ed Oswald, The Best Crowdfunding Sites for 2019, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 26, 2019, 
3:10 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/best-crowdfunding-sites/ 
[https://perma.cc/FDS2-PNSS]. 
 34. Kalle Setälä, Crowdfunding in the Banking Industry: Adjusting to a Digital Era 




 35. Id. 
 36. “Fintech” is a term that “encompasses all forms of innovative digital and software 
technologies applied directly to the financial services sector.”  Luke G. Thomas, Note, The 
Case for A Federal Regulatory Sandbox for Fintech Companies, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 257, 
260 (2018). 
 37. Arooj Z. Nazir, The Development of Real Estate Crowdfunding: Will It Surpass 
Traditional Real Estate Financing?, 24 PIABA B.J. 77, 81 (2017). 
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based,38 rewards-based, and pre-purchase-based crowdfunding39 are 
popular forms of crowdfunding,40 this Note focuses on the for-profit 
crowdfunding methods of equity crowdfunding41 and marketplace 
lending.42 
 
 38. Donations-based crowdfunding allows individuals to contribute donations to a 
crowdfunding effort without receiving anything in return.  See id. (describing various types 
of crowdfunding, including donations-based crowdfunding).  If a crowdfunding campaign 
includes no potential for return in exchange for a contribution, then there is no offering of 
securities.  Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the 
Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must be Conditioned on Meaningful 
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1739 (2012) (explaining that if there is no “express or 
implied possibility of a return to the donor, there is no offering of securities.”).  Because 
donors have no possibility of return, this model of crowdfunding does not meet the definition 
of “investment contract” outlined in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. and therefore does not implicate 
securities laws.  S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (defining 
“investment contract” as “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his 
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the 
promoter or a third party . . . .”).  Donations may fund for-profit enterprises, but most donation 
sites focus on non-profit organizations.  Bradford, supra note 8, at 15–16.  Popular donations-
based crowdfunding sites include globalgiving.org, GLOBALGIVING, globalgiving.org 
[https://perma.cc/2QPM-E22G] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019), and donorschoose.org. 
DONORSCHOOSE.ORG, donorschoose.org [https://perma.cc/M765-B7V8] (last visited Sept. 21, 
2019).  Pure donations-based crowdfunding sites are rare.  Id. at 15. 
 39. Rewards-based crowdfunding provides contributors to a crowdfunding effort with a 
“tangible benefit in exchange for their donation.”  Nazir, supra note 37, at 81–82.  Pre-
purchase-based crowdfunding is similar to rewards-based crowdfunding and is where 
contributors receive the product that the business or entrepreneur creates.  Bradford, supra 
note 8, at 16.  In order to avoid implicating securities laws, the benefit for both forms of 
crowdfunding cannot involve a financial return such as “interest, dividends, or part of the 
earnings of the business.”  Id.  Rewards and pre-purchase-based crowdfunding are the most 
common forms of crowdfunding.  Nazir, supra note 37, at 81.  Popular platforms that use 
these forms of crowdfunding include Kickstarter, GoFundMe, and Indiegogo.  Jackie 
Zimmermann, Rewards-Based Crowdfunding: What it is, When it Works, NERDWALLET (Dec. 
6, 2017), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/small-business/reward-crowdfunding/ 
[https://perma.cc/887R-2FFM].  Examples of rewards given to backers include t-shirts, digital 
downloads of albums, and “thank you” calls.  Bradford, supra note 8, at 18.  In its first case 
involving crowdfunding, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) took legal action in 2015 
against a project creator who raised funds through Kickstarter for a board game but spent most 
of the funds on himself.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Crowdfunding Project Creator 
Settles FTC Charges of Deception (June 11, 2015) https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2015/06/crowdfunding-project-creator-settles-ftc-charges-deception 
[https://perma.cc/QSN4-DF6Q] (describing the first crowdfunding case the FTC became 
involved in). In the campaign, the defendant raised over $122,000 from 1,246 backers, 
promising them rewards of a copy of the game or a figurine.  Id.  The case settled and 
represents an ongoing effort by the FTC to protect consumers involved in fintech and the 
potential for the FTC to become involved in this form of crowdfunding in the future.  Id. 
 40. See Nazir, supra note 37, at 81–82 (describing that the pre-purchase-based 
crowdfunding is the most common form of crowdfunding, while providing examples of 
successful donations-based crowdfunding platforms and rewards-based crowdfunding 
campaigns). 
 41. See infra Part II.A. 
 42. See infra Part II.B. 
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A. Equity Crowdfunding 
Equity crowdfunding is a process that allows investors to 
purchase ownership interests in companies.43  Because this form of 
crowdfunding involves the sale of a security,44 it implicates federal 
securities laws and is subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”).45  In general, any sale or offering of securities 
must qualify for an exemption in order to avoid registration under the 
Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”).46  Prior to 2012, equity 
crowdfunding platforms were primarily governed by the Regulation D 
(“Reg D”) and Regulation A (“Reg A”) 1933 Act exemptions.47  These 
exemptions decrease regulatory obligations for issuers, reducing their 
costs and time to raise capital.48   
On March 27, 2012, Congress enacted the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”) in order to expand access to public 
capital markets for emerging growth companies.49  Congress designated 
Title III of the JOBS Act as the Capital Raising Online While Deterring 
Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012 (“CROWDFUND 
Act”).50  The CROWDFUND Act served as the foundation for equity 
crowdfunding in the United States.51  This Act provided an exemption 
from registration with the SEC for the offer and sale of up to $1 million 
of securities in a twelve-month period to non-accredited investors.52  
 
 43. John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, 
Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 
589 (2013). 
 44. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297–99 (1946). 
 45. Bradford, supra note 8, at 33. 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2018). 
 47. SCOTT BAUGUESS ET AL., U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE 
U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009‐2017 5 
(2018), https://www.sec.gov/files/DERA%20white%20paper_Regulation%20D_082018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BH2R-F43W]. 
 48. Id. at 3. 
 49. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306 (2012) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Max E. Isaacson, Note, The So-Called Democratization of Capital Markets: Why 
Title III of the Jobs Act Fails to Fulfill the Promise of Crowdfunding, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 
439, 440 (2016). 
 52. A non-accredited investor is any investor who does not meet the income or net worth 
requirements to be an accredited investor as defined by the SEC.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) 
(2019).  For natural persons to be considered accredited investors, the current standard is an 
individual net worth or joint net worth with that person’s spouse of over $1,000,000 excluding 
the value of the primary residence, id. at § 230.501(a)(5), or an individual income of $200,000 
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On October 15, 2015, the SEC adopted a rule called Regulation 
Crowdfunding (“Reg CF”) that became effective on May 16, 2016 and 
implemented the requirements of the CROWDFUND Act.53  Under the 
rule as updated in 2017, issuers can raise up to an aggregate of $1.07 
million over a twelve-month period without registering their offering 
with the SEC.54  The aggregate amount individuals may invest in 
offerings shall not exceed the greater of $2200 or five percent of the 
investor’s annual income if the investor’s annual income is less than 
$107,000.55  If the investor’s annual income and net worth are equal to or 
greater than $107,000, then the individual can invest up to the lesser of 
either ten percent of his or her annual income, or ten percent of his or her 
net worth, up to a maximum of $107,000.56  Reg CF also introduced the 
funding portal, a new kind of entity that acts as an intermediary in 
transactions involving the offer or sale of securities on behalf of others.57  
This regulation allows ordinary retail investors to invest in private 
businesses as a crowd through these funding portals.58   
Companies relying on Reg D are exempt from registering their 
offerings but must file “Form D”, which includes information about the 
issuer’s identity, principal place of business, related persons, industry 
group, and other basic information.59  Currently, Reg D consists of three 
 
or more annually, or a joint income of $300,000 or more including the income of a spouse.  
Id. at § 230.501(a)(6). 
 53. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 
227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269 & 274). 
 54. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1).  Under the original rule, issuers could raise up to an 
aggregate of $1 million over a 12-month period without registering their offering with the 
SEC.  Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71391 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269 & 274). 
 55. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2)(i).  Under the original rule, the aggregate amount 
individuals could invest in offerings could not exceed the greater of $2,000 or five percent of 
the investor’s annual income if the investor’s annual income was less than $100,000.  
Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71392 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 
227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, & 274). 
 56. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2)(ii).  Under the original rule, if the investor’s annual income 
and net worth are equal to or greater than $100,000, then the investor could invest up to the 
lesser of ten percent of his or her annual income or ten percent of his or her net worth, with a 
maximum of $100,000.  Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71390 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269 & 274). 
 57. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 
227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269 & 274). 
 58. Georgia Quinn, Title III Crowdfunding: Talking About a Revolution, CROWDFUND 
INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2015, 12:32 PM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/10/76506-title-
iii-crowdfunding-talking-about-a-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/4FBY-HKGY]. 
 59. Examples of other basic information required in Form D includes issuer size, federal 
exemptions and exclusions claimed, type of filing, duration of offering, type(s) of securities 
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rules: Rule 504,60 Rule 506(b),61 and Rule 506(c).62  Between 2009 and 
2017, almost all of the reported offerings through Reg D used Rules 
506(b) and 506(c).63  Rule 506(b) prohibits general solicitation and 
advertising and limits investors to accredited investors and up to thirty-
five sophisticated, non-accredited investors.64  Rule 506(c), as amended 
by the SEC pursuant to Title II of the JOBS Act,65 permits general 
solicitation and advertising if the offering is limited to accredited 
investors.66  In 2017, $1.8 trillion of capital was raised using Rules 506(b) 
or 506(c),67 with an overwhelming majority raised pursuant to Rule 
506(b).68  
Reg A69 was amended in 2015 pursuant to Title IV of the JOBS 
Act.70  The amended regulation (“Reg A+”) increased the exemption for 
registration requirements for private offerings from up to $5 million to up 
to $50 million over a twelve-month period.71  Reg A+ splits offerings into 
two tiers.72  Each tier is subject to certain reporting requirements and 
regulatory compliance.73  Tier 1 requires only exit reports, while Tier 2 
requires annual reports, semiannual reports, current event reports, audited 
 
offered, whether the offer involves a business combination transaction, minimum investment, 
sales compensation, offering and sales amount, sales compensation, offering and sales 
amounts, investors, sales commissions and finders’ fee expenses, and use of proceeds.  Form 
D: Notice of Exempt Offerings of Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9DK-45ZU]. 
 60. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2015). 
 61. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b). 
 62. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c); BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 47, at 4. 
 63. Between 2009 and 2017, 99.9% of the reported offerings through Reg D used Rules 
506(b) and 506(c).  BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 47 at 2. 
 64. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i). 
 65. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”) § 201, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 
Stat 306 (2012) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 66. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c). 
 67. BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 47, at 4. 
 68. From September 23, 2013, to December 31, 2017, only 4.4% of Rule 506 offerings 
have raised capital pursuant to Rule 506(c), with 95.6% of offerings having raised capital 
pursuant to Rule 506(b).  Id. at 15. 
 69. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2017). 
 70. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306 (2012) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 71. Isaacson, supra note 51, at 448. 
 72. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251.  Tier 1 allows issuers to offer up to $20 million over a 12-month 
period and Tier 2 allowing issuers to offer up to $50 million over a 12-month period.  Id.  Tier 
1 does not put a limit on non-accredited investors investing in a Tier 1 offering, while Tier 2 
limits the amount that non-accreditors can invest to no more than 10% of the purchaser’s net 
worth or annual income, whichever is greater.  Id. at § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C). 
 73. Isaacson, supra note 51, at 448. 
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financial statements, and exit reports.74  Reg A+ acts as an alternative to 
a small Initial Public Offering or other securities offering methods under 
the 1933 Act.75  However, the cost of regulatory compliance creates a 
high barrier for Reg A+ offerings, making this exemption unlikely to 
trump Reg D for raising capital.76  Compared to Reg CF and Reg A 
offerings, Reg D offerings raise more capital and occur more 
frequently.77 
B. Marketplace Lending 
Marketplace lending78 involves contributors who loan money and 
expect their loans to be returned in the future, normally with interest.79  
This form of crowdfunding involves the “crowd” lending to borrowers 
through unsecured loans.80  These loans are typically made to individuals 
or small businesses.81  The most common form of marketplace loans are 
unsecured consumer loans, while small business loans are a growing 
second.82  The two most popular marketplace lenders are LendingClub83 
and Prosper.84  As of June 30, 2019, LendingClub issued over $50 billion 
in loans85 while Prosper facilitated more than $16 billion in loans as of 
 
 74. 17 C.F.R. § 230.257 (2019). 
 75. ANZHELA KNYAZEVA, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION A+: WHAT DO WE 
KNOW SO FAR? 2 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/files/Knyazeva_RegulationA%20.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QYB2-LRQG] (analyzing Regulation A+ activity for approximately 16 
months after the amendments to Regulation A became effective). 
 76. Isaacson, supra note 51, at 449. 
 77. BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 47, at 9. 
 78. Marketplace lending is also known as peer-to-peer lending.  John L. Douglas, New 
Wine into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory World, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 17, 
27 (2016).  This practice is also referred to as debt crowdfunding, person-to-person lending, 
P2P lending, or lending-based crowdfunding.  Wroldsen, supra note 43, at 588–89. 
 79. Wroldsen, supra note 43, at 588–89. 
 80. David M. Freeman & Matthew R. Nutting, A Brief History of Crowdfunding, 1, 3 
(2015), http://www.freedman-chicago.com/ec4i/History-of-Crowdfunding.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ND2B-TTST]. 
 81. David W. Perkins, Marketplace Lending: Fintech in Consumer and Small-Business 
Lending, CONG. RES. SERV. 1 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44614.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D2PF-75LD]. 
 82. Marketplace Lending 2.0, DELOITTE (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/financial-services/articles/marketplace-lending-and-
banks-report.html [https://perma.cc/66DU-7CVN]. 
 83. LENDINGCLUB, https://www.lendingclub.com/info/statistics.action 
[https://perma.cc/L6X6-8TYU] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
 84. PROSPER, https://www.prosper.com/about [https://perma.cc/M88S-KNLC] (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
 85. LENDINGCLUB, supra note 83. 
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September 15, 2019.86  To provide a loan, the marketplace lending 
platform must approve the borrower.87  Once approved, the borrower 
receives a credit risk score and an interest rate determined by the 
platform.88  Because most of the platform’s services are automated, 
getting a loan can be easier, faster, and more cost effective than 
borrowing from a bank.89 
In 2008, the SEC issued a cease and desist order against 
Prosper.90  The SEC declared that Prosper, and by extension other 
marketplace lending platforms, were offering securities.91  Following the 
SEC’s cease and desist order, marketplace lending platforms had to shelf 
register92 each loan before a lender’s investment.93  Details of each 
funded loan are now recorded on EDGAR.94 
The cease and desist order also changed how marketplace lending 
platforms conduct their transactions.95  Before the SEC’s order, platforms 
such as Prosper and LendingClub originated loans to borrowers, and 
WebBank, a Utah-chartered industrial bank96 funded the loans.97  
WebBank then assigned the note to the lender through the platform.98  
After the order, notes issued by Prosper and similar marketplace lending 
 
 86. PROSPER, supra note 84. 
 87. Freeman & Nutting, supra note 80, at 3–4. 
 88. Id. at 4. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8984, 2008 WL 4978684, at 
*1 (Nov. 24, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/33-8984.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DA6X-D5QJ]. 
 91. Id. at *4. 
 92. Shelf registration is a method for issuers to register new offerings on a delayed basis 
without having to issue them immediately.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2019) (describing the 
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securities and then issue them in parts.  See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-
to-Person Lending, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 445, 489 (2011) (explaining the advantages of shelf 
registration for peer-to-peer lending platforms).  Shelf registration is essential for peer-to-peer 
lending platforms because it allows issuers “economies of scale in registration.”  Id. 
 93. See Benjamin Lo, It Ain’t Broke: The Case for Continued SEC Regulation of P2P 
Lending, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 87, 89 (2016) (describing the shelf registration process for 
peer-to-peer loans). 
 94. EDGAR is the SEC’s publicly accessible disclosure database.  Id. 
 95. Verstein, supra note 92, at 476–77. 
 96. An industrial bank is “a financial institution deriving funds from the sale of 
investment certificates and from deposits made by individual savers and investing such funds 
in personal loans often secured by a comaker note or chattel mortgage.”  Industrial Bank, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/industrial%20bank [https://perma.cc/AFJ2-ZB2U] (last visited Oct. 
25, 2019). 
 97. Verstein, supra note 92, at 476. 
 98. Id. 
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platforms continue to remain the platform’s obligation.99  These notes, 
also known as “borrower payment dependent notes,”100 are debt 
instruments sold to lenders who then receive money contingent on 
borrower repayment.101  After the SEC’s cease and desist order, all 
marketplace lending platforms either registered with the SEC or failed.102  
While the marketplace lending platform now formally retains loans that 
are funded and selected by investors, in practice investors bear the credit 
risk because the notes offered by the platforms are only payable once 
borrowers make payments on their loans.103  Despite these changes in 
regulation and transactions following the SEC’s order in 2008, 
marketplace lending remains popular.104 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) tasked the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (“GAO”) with studying marketplace lending in order to develop 
an “optimal federal regulatory structure.”105  The GAO study was 
completed in 2011 and found two primary regulatory options for 
marketplace lending, which offered different approaches to lender 
protection.106  The two options recommended by the GAO included: “(1) 
continuing with the current bifurcated federal system—that is, protecting 
lenders through securities regulators and borrowers primarily through 
financial services regulators . . . or (2) consolidating borrower and lender 
protection under a single federal regulator, such as CFPB.”107  However, 
the report was inconclusive on which option Congress should select, so 
marketplace lending platforms remain regulated by the SEC.108   
 
 99. Id. at 476–77. 
 100. Id. at 477. 
 101. Id. at 476–77. 
 102. Chang-hsien Tsai, To Regulate or Not to Regulate? A Comparison of Government 
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L. REV. 1077, 1085 (2018). 
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 104. Lo, supra note 93, at 90.  For example, LendingClub has issued over $50 billion in 
loans as of June 30, 2019, LENDINGCLUB, supra note 83, while Prosper has facilitated more 
than $16 billion in loans as of September 15, 2019. PROSPER, supra note 84. 
 105. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank 
Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989F(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1947 (2010) (tasking the GAO with 
conducting a study to determine the optimal federal regulatory structure for person to person 
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 106. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REP. NO. 11-613 42 (2011), 
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11613.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM7B-T999]. 
 107. Id. 
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The proper regulation of marketplace lending and other fintech 
companies remains open to debate.109  In 2016, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“the OCC”) offered guidance on the 
possibility of creating a special purpose national bank charter for fintech 
companies,110 including marketplace lending platforms.111  The OCC 
declared that a fintech company must, at minimum, receive deposits, pay 
checks, or lend money to receive a special purpose bank charter.112  
However, in May 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York held that the OCC could not issue a special purpose bank 
charter to a fintech company that does not receive deposits.113  The court 
held that the National Bank Act114 was unambiguous that the “business 
of banking” requires receiving deposits.115  While this decision calls into 
question the OCC’s ability to issue a special purpose bank charter for a 
fintech company, it remains unclear whether marketplace lending 
platforms are included in the OCC’s definition of a fintech company.116 
III.  THE IMPACT OF CROWDFUNDING ON BANK LENDING 
While bank lending continues to be a major source of capital for 
businesses, banks remain concerned about firm creditworthiness and are 
hesitant to provide loans to businesses without proven track records, 
consistent cash flows,117 or sufficient assets to pledge as collateral.118  
This reluctance increased as a result of the 2008 financial crisis,119 as 
banks became more “risk-averse” and faced tightened regulations in its 
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 113. Vullo v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 
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 118. See Berger & Udell, supra note 11, at 624 (stating that banks will generally not lend 
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aftermath.120  Growing demand for alternative funding established 
crowdfunding methods like marketplace lending and equity 
crowdfunding as popular sources of funding for startups and small-to-
medium sized businesses.121 
Under traditional “pecking order theory,”122 information 
asymmetries typically drive entrepreneurs to use internal funds whenever 
available.123  However, when these funds are lacking, entrepreneurs turn 
to debt financing, which includes marketplace lending.124  Entrepreneurs 
usually prefer debt financing to equity financing because equity financing 
normally involves a dilution of their ownership share.125  If debt financing 
is neither available nor a practical option, entrepreneurs turn to external 
equity financing.126  Equity crowdfunding, a form of external equity 
financing, is therefore employed as a last resort under traditional pecking 
order theory.127  
A. The Impact of Marketplace Lending on Bank Lending 
Marketplace lending represents a developing non-bank activity 
that competes with the traditional financial intermediation conducted by 
commercial banks.128  In 2015, the two largest marketplace lending 
platforms originated $12 billion in personal unsecured loans,129 compared 
to $241 billion of outstanding personal loans in the United States.130  A 
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 121. See id. (exploring the potential use of crowdfunding as an alternative to bank 
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 124. Id. 
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2016 report found that the global marketplace lending market was $26.6 
billion in 2015, but it anticipates that this market will be worth $897.85 
billion by 2024.131  This projected growth is attributed to the after-effects 
of the 2008 financial crisis, including low interest rates and lack of 
sufficient funding for businesses.132  Technological advances, improved 
online interfaces, and numerous partnerships between crowdfunding 
platforms are also expected to contribute to this industry’s growth.133 
For borrowers, loans from marketplace lenders generally charge 
lower interest rates than similar bank loans because a majority of 
marketplace lending services are automated, resulting in lower overhead 
for the platforms.134  Because marketplace lending represents an 
alternative to bank lending, marketplace lenders compete with banks.135  
These lenders are able to provide loans to high-risk borrowers who cannot 
obtain credit from traditional financial intermediaries.136  This facilitates 
credit expansion for borrowers who are deemed too risky by commercial 
banks.137  Marketplace lending also affects small commercial banks 
through these banks’ losses in loan volume and acceptance of riskier 
borrowers.138  Most of these losses in loan volume come from high-risk 
loans, as low credit borrowers seek marketplace loans in place of 
commercial bank loans.139  Large commercial banks do not currently 
appear to be losing loan volume to marketplace lenders.140  Marketplace 
lending is likely to progressively affect bank lending in the future as the 
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global marketplace lending industry increases in size and more borrowers 
choose marketplace loans.141 
B. The Impact of Equity Crowdfunding on Bank Lending 
While marketplace lending directly competes with bank 
lending,142 equity crowdfunding is in less direct competition with bank 
lending because entrepreneurs traditionally choose debt financing over 
equity financing.143  Although still in its infancy, equity crowdfunding is 
becoming an increasingly popular source of external finance for early 
stage companies,144 as banks restricted lending after the 2008 financial 
crisis.145  Following the implementation of Reg CF and Reg A+, the 
“crowd” became more involved in equity crowdfunding campaigns.146  
However, Reg D offerings continue to raise significantly more capital and 
occur more frequently compared to Reg CF and Reg A+ offerings.147  Reg 
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D offerings under 506(b) and 506(c) only apply narrowly in scope to 
accredited investors148 and a limited number of non-accredited 
investors.149  Because Reg CF and Reg A+ do not limit the number of 
non-accredited investors who can invest in an equity crowdfunding 
campaign, they are viewed as a step in the right direction towards 
allowing the “crowd” to engage in investment opportunities.150 
Entrepreneurs usually prefer debt financing to equity financing 
because equity financing usually involves a dilution of their ownership 
share.151  If debt financing is neither available nor a practical option, 
entrepreneurs turn to external equity financing.152  A 2018 study 
examined data from 277 firms that searched for equity crowdfunding on 
Crowdcube, a UK crowdfunding platform, to determine how equity 
crowdfunding fits into traditional pecking order theory.153  The study 
found that firms which are less profitable, lack internal funding, have 
excessive debt levels, and have high levels of intangible assets are more 
likely to search for crowdfunding.154  This indicates that firms tend to 
choose equity crowdfunding as a last resort.155  Therefore, the study 
suggests that equity crowdfunding does not directly compete with bank 
lending because entrepreneurs typically choose debt over equity 
financing.156  However, equity crowdfunding can help banks close the 
gap on informational asymmetries that typically cause banks to avoid 
lending to startup companies without a proven track record.157  A 
successful equity crowdfunding campaign signals to banks that the 
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startup company will be profitable in the future and less likely to default 
on a loan.158 
IV.  PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN BANKS AND CROWDFUNDING PLATFORMS 
A. Bank Partnerships with Marketplace Lending Platforms 
Although marketplace lending platforms primarily affect banks 
through losses in loan volume and the acceptance of riskier borrowers by 
small commercial banks,159 there are opportunities for partnerships and 
collaboration between marketplace lenders and banks of all sizes.160  As 
the global marketplace lending market exhibits a high potential for 
growth,161 some banks have noticed marketplace lending and become 
involved in the industry.162  Banks commonly partner with marketplace 
lenders to facilitate loan transactions.163  Banks and marketplace lenders 
have also formed partnerships through acquisitions, joint ventures, and 
hybrid lending practices.164 
While many marketplace lenders lend directly to borrowers, some 
partner with banks to facilitate loan transactions.165  In this partnership, 
the marketplace lender collects borrower applications, provides credit 
grades, and then refers the application to its partner bank.166  Once the 
partner bank receives the application, the bank makes the loan to the 
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borrower and then sells the loan back to the marketplace lender.167  The 
marketplace lender issues securities notes to the investors who pledged 
to provide funding for the loan.168  The borrower then makes monthly 
payments to the marketplace lender, who issues payments to the investors 
and charges a fee.169   
Acquisitions and joint ventures between banks and marketplace 
lenders reduce banks’ lending costs through the implementation of 
technology that provides banks with automated services and makes 
lending easier, faster, and more cost effective.170  As of 2019, PNC 
Bank’s partnership with digital lender OnDeck Capital allows U.S. 
businesses to apply for lines of credit up to $100,000 on PNC’s website 
and receive an answer almost immediately through the use of OnDeck’s 
technology.171  PNC’s goal is to make credit access easier and faster for 
small businesses.172  Similarly, JP Morgan and OnDeck Capital began a 
partnership in 2016, wherein OnDeck provided its technology to JP 
Morgan for the bank to offer online loans to small businesses.173  When 
the partnership ended in 2019, JP Morgan developed its own platform to 
continue to offer these online loans to small businesses.174   
Banks and marketplace lending platforms also partner at the 
community banking level.175  The BancAlliance network, a national 
group of community banks ranging from $200 million to $10 billion in 
assets, and LendingClub formed a partnership in 2015.176  This 
partnership offers BancAlliance members access to co-branded personal 
loans through the LendingClub platform and the ability purchase some of 
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the loans for their own portfolios.177  The partnership pairs 
LendingClub’s low cost of operations with the community banks’ low 
cost of capital to decrease the cost of credit for consumers.178   
Another potential partnership between banks and marketplace 
lending platforms involves a practice called “hybrid lending.”179  Hybrid 
lending combines normal balance sheet lending with off-balance sheet 
lending through marketplace lending platforms.180  Normal balance sheet 
lending refers to the traditional financial intermediation of loans by banks 
through withdrawable deposits, where banks lend to a borrower and hold 
the loan on their balance sheet to maturity.181  Off-balance sheet lending 
refers to loans that have been moved off of a bank’s balance sheet through 
pooling and securitization.182  The combination of balance sheet and off-
balance sheet lending allows businesses to finance part of a loan through 
a marketplace lending platform and the rest through traditional bank 
lending.183  Rabobank, a Dutch bank, is one of the first banks in the world 
to adopt a hybrid model through its own hybrid platform called Rabo & 
Co.184  The bank offers businesses the ability to finance part of their loan 
on the bank’s balance sheet, while providing the remaining funding 
through co-financing from institutional investors and banking clients.185  
Currently, this hybrid model is used by many of the leading marketplace 
lending platforms.186 
Hybrid lending is advantageous for banks involved in lending to 
riskier businesses such as startups and small businesses because it 
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mitigates the lender’s risk.187  This model is also advantageous for 
investors.188  When the originator of a loan retains some risk on their 
balance sheet, investors have more confidence in the loans because their 
incentives are aligned with the originator’s.189  Additionally, the model 
helps lenders survive periods of capital scarcity in the marketplace 
lending market.190  As small commercial banks have been affected the 
most by marketplace lending through losses in loan volume and the 
acceptance of riskier borrowers, they stand to gain the most from hybrid 
lending.191   
B. Bank Partnerships with Equity Crowdfunding Platforms 
While equity crowdfunding may be a last resort for firms in 
search of capital,192 some banks such as Fresno First Bank have formed 
partnerships with equity crowdfunding platforms.193  In general, banks 
are hesitant to provide loans to unproven startups and small businesses 
that do not have significant assets.194  Therefore, the primary advantages 
of bank partnering with equity crowdfunding sites are reducing 
information asymmetries that cause banks to avoid lending to startups 
and small businesses, and providing startups and small businesses with 
collateral.195  The popularity of an equity crowdfunding campaign signals 
to the bank that a venture can be successful,196 while the campaign can 
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also provide the business with sufficient capital to pledge as collateral for 
a loan.197 
In 2016, Fresno First Bank formed a partnership with equity 
crowdfunding platform Breakaway Funding.198  This partnership was 
designed to allow the bank to evaluate prospective clients earlier in the 
capital cycle than it could otherwise.199  First, Breakaway Funding 
receives important business information such as business plans, financial 
projections, and financial statements.200  Then, Breakaway Funding 
packages the information for review by the bank.201  This information, 
along with the support that a crowdfunding project receives from backers, 
helps close the information gap that normally causes banks to avoid 
lending to these businesses.202  Full Circle Brewing Co. utilized this 
partnership to receive a traditional bank loan from Fresno First Bank after 
its successful equity crowdfunding campaign.203   
V.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although crowdfunding does not yet rival traditional bank 
lending, there is clear demand for alternative funding that poses a threat 
to the banking industry.204  Banks now realize the business potential for 
crowdfunding and are becoming involved in the industry through their 
own platforms or through partnerships with existing platforms.205  
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Although banks face less direct competition from equity crowdfunding 
than from marketplace lending,206 banks have the opportunity to benefit 
through partnerships with equity crowdfunding platforms.207  These 
partnerships expand bank lending to startups and small businesses 
through campaigns that provide ventures with capital that can be used as 
collateral208 and help close the information asymmetry gap between these 
borrowers and banks.209   
Marketplace lending, on the other hand, directly competes with 
bank lending.210  Nevertheless, partnerships between banks and 
marketplace lending platforms can position banks to benefit from the rise 
of the marketplace lending industry.211  Banks should choose to partner 
with marketplace lending platforms directly through facilitating loan 
transactions, acquisitions, or joint ventures,212 or adopt hybrid lending 
practices which allow banks to lend to riskier borrowers such as startups 
and small businesses.213  As marketplace lending increases,214 these 
partnerships will provide a growing source of revenue for banks and 
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